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“Under Fathoms of Salt Water”
Canada’s Ammunition Dumping Program,
1944-1947
ALEX SOUCHEN
Abstract : This article examines Canada’s ammunition dumping program
in the mid-1940s and pays special attention to the practical and technical
dilemmas that influenced policy making and implementation. A pressing
logistical crisis followed the end of the Second World War as crowded
armaments depots ran out of storage space for leftover ordnance. In
July 1945 a major explosion at the Bedford Magazine in Halifax Harbour
heightened public safety concerns and influenced future disposal policies.
From a range of imperfect destruction methods, dumping emerged as one
of the most efficient alternatives; whenever possible conventional and
chemical munitions were submerged. Although the quantities sunk by the
Americans, British, and Russians dwarf the amount dumped by Canada,
the Canadian dumping program was no less important to the nation’s
postwar transition or without serious ramifications for Canadians and
their coastal environments.

A

6:30 pm on the evening of 18 July 1945 a fire broke out on the
south jetty of Canada’s largest ammunition depot, the Bedford
Magazine in Halifax Harbour. The fire quickly spread to nearby
stacks of ammunition that exploded and then up the hill to other
piles of shells temporarily stored outside because of overcrowding
in the stowage bunkers. Unable to contain the raging inferno, first
responders and civilians alike evacuated while a chain reaction of
explosions continued for twenty-four hours, completely destroying the
south end of the facility and damaging many other buildings. In the
end, this “other” Halifax Explosion killed one person and injured
dozens more, so it was nowhere near as devastating as the 1917
tragedy that levelled large parts of the city and killed almost 2,000
t
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Photo 1: The Bedford Magazine Explosion at night. [J. C. M. Hayward, Nova Scotia Archives,
Accession No. 1981-517 3, 18 July 1945]

people.1 However, the Bedford Magazine Explosion was nonetheless
an important turning point in the history of Canada’s postwar
demobilization.
The causes and consequences of the Bedford Explosion
demonstrate the complexities involved in the process of ending war.
The incident highlighted perhaps the most pressing issue facing the
Canadian military once Germany was defeated. Victory precipitated
a major crisis in logistics and storage; and the destruction of the
Bedford depot only made the crisis worse. When the Second World
War ended, the munitions and supplies accumulated to fight did not
just disappear. Rather, they lived on in peacetime and continued
to occupy physical space regardless of their potential utility or
obsolescence. Moreover, until their primary form and function was
modified, unused munitions and supplies maintained the capacity
to fulfill their intended purposes—which, in the case of ordnance,
was to explode, kill, and maim. Not only were these assets a serious

1  
For background information see: John Griffith Armstrong, The Halifax Explosion
and the Royal Canadian Navy: Inquiry and Intrigue, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002)
and H. Millard Wright, The Other Halifax Explosion: Bedford Magazine July 18-20,
1945, (no publisher, no date).

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol26/iss2/3

2

Souchen: “Under Fathoms of Salt Water”
SOUCHEN

3

threat to public safety, but they also confounded military and civilian
authorities with a continuing financial and logistical burden. In effect,
the disposal of leftover ammunition and explosives was an issue
that demanded special attention in a disposal program designed to
accommodate the military’s rapid demobilization. However, quickly
divesting such large amounts of unneeded materiel proved quite
challenging to operate and oversee immediately following the war.
So what happened to all the bombs and bullets produced during
the war that were never used in combat? The short answer is: they
were thrown into the oceans. Following the Second World War, vast
quantities of unneeded ammunition and explosives were intentionally
submerged to facilitate disarmament. Ocean dumping was a useful
disposal method, as it eliminated the remaining bulk of German
and Japanese fighting potential and also aided in the demobilization
of Allied fighting forces. Pioneered after the Great War, ocean
dumping was seen as an efficient and safe disposal method for both
conventional and chemical weapons, and the practice continued
until prohibited by the Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matter (commonly known
as the London Convention) in 1972.2
This article examines Canada’s ammunition dumping program
and pays special attention to the practical and technical dilemmas
that influenced both policy making and implementation. The war’s
end created a pressing logistical crisis for the Canadian military
that resulted in the Bedford disaster, while the explosion heightened
concerns for public safety and influenced disposal policies to favour
the immediate destruction of surplus munitions. From a range of
imperfect destruction methods, dumping emerged as one of the most
efficient alternatives and was adopted to divest surplus and captured
ordnance whenever feasible. Canada’s postwar dumping program
involved all types of conventional and chemical munitions common
to the Second World War and took place along the country’s eastern
and western shores as well as in the Great Lakes and European
coastal waters. Although the quantities sunk by the Americans,
British, and Russians dwarf the amount dumped by Canada, the

In 1975, Parliament passed the Ocean Dumping Control Act to meet Canada’s
international obligations for controlling marine pollution. Environment and
Climate Change Canada, “Disposal at Sea,” https://www.ec.gc.ca/iem-das/default.
asp?lang=En&n=55A643AE-1 (accessed 1 August 2016).

2  
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Canadian disposal program was no less important to the nation’s
postwar transition and had serious ramifications for Canadians and
their costal environs.

the postwar storage crisis
The origins of Canada’s dumping program started with the nature of
wartime industrial production. From the outset, the war unlocked
an avalanche of public and private investment that rejuvenated the
national economy after a decade-long depression. Between 1939 and
1943, the manufacturing sector’s net value of production increased by
167 per cent.3 Largely on the back of new manufacturing capacities
sponsored by the government, Canada’s gnp rose from $5.6 billion
in 1939 to almost $12 billion in 1945, and the value of the country’s
total expenditures on all types of war goods (including munitions,
supplies, defence construction, and military pay) totalled roughly
$28 billion.4 By 1945, Canadian factories had built some 9,000 ships,
50,000 armoured vehicles and tanks, 16,000 aircraft, 850,000 militarypattern vehicles, and 1.5 million firearms. The industrial front also
churned out 72 million artillery and mortar shells and a whopping 4.4
billion rounds of ammunition—enough to shoot two bullets at every
human on the planet in 1945.5 With the exception of military-pattern
vehicles, Canada’s production totals were eclipsed by its largest
Allies. The Americans produced a mind-boggling 41 billion rounds

3  
O. J. Firestone, Locations and Effects of Wartime Industrial Expansion in Canada
1939-1944 (Ottawa: Department of Reconstruction, 1945), 1.
4  
Michael Hennessy, “The Industrial Front: The Scale and Scope of Canadian
Industrial Mobilization during the Second World War,” in Bernd Horn, ed., Forging
a Nation: Perspectives on the Canadian Military Experience (St. Catharines, ON:
Vanwell Publishing, 2002), 143; O. J. Firestone, Encouragement to Industrial
Expansion in Canada: Operation of Special Depreciation Provisions, November 10,
1944-March 31, 1947 (Ottawa: Department of Reconstruction and Supply, 1948), 13.
5  
Jeffrey Keshen, Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers: Canada’s Second World War
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 42-45; Hennessy, “The Industrial Front,” 141-44; J.
de N. Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply: Canada in the
Second World War, Vol. I: Production Branches and Crown Companies (Ottawa:
HMSO, 1950), 3-9; Canadian War Museum (CWM), Looking Ahead: The Job We’ve
Done, Canadian Post-War Affairs, Discussion Manual No. 2 (Ottawa: HMSO,
1945), 24-25.
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of ammunition while the British produced over 11 billion rounds.6
To put it mildly, these totals constituted a phenomenal amount of
firepower that does not include everything manufactured by the Axis
powers. Although it is difficult to extrapolate consumption rates or
estimate what was left over in 1945, it is reasonable to infer that a
large portion was expended, a significant amount was maintained
for postwar requirements, and substantial quantities were sold or
transferred to other Allies as military aid.7 However, the remainder
of war-related materiel posed a serious dilemma and captured enemy
weaponry only complicated matters further.
After years of conflict that brought death and destruction to
every corner of the globe, political and military leaders had no
illusions about the dangers of leftover ordnance. They knew how
disrupting these items were to political, economic, and social stability
and they also understood that ammunition would not simply
disappear. Lethal assets required special disposal procedures that
hinged almost entirely upon procuring sufficient storage space and
efficient destruction methods. When hostilities ended, finding the
space to deposit these hazardous stores became a major quagmire.
To illustrate the point, consider the logistics of Canada’s industrial
war effort as water moving through a pipeline. When the valves at
the war front were closed in May 1945, the water that had already
entered the pipeline at one end backed up at the other, thus creating
a growing reservoir of surplus materiel.8 However, the underlying
problem stemmed from the fact that Canada’s pipeline was designed
to extract resources, manufacture munitions, and distribute them
overseas as quickly as possible. It was not designed to hold items in
prolonged or indefinite storage.

Arthur Herman, Freedom’s Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in
World War II (New York: Random House, 2012), iv and 335; David Edgerton,
Britain’s War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World War
(London: Penguin Books, 2012), 274-76.
7  
For examples, see: Sam Lebovic, “From War Junk to Educational Exchange: The
World War II Origins of the Fulbright Program and the Foundations of American
Cultural Globalism, 1945–1950,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 37, No. 2 (April, 2013):
280–312; “The Dutch Inheritance (1): Deelen Demob Vehicle Park,” Wheels &
Tracks, No. 55: 30-42.
8  
Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG101 Crown Assets Disposal Corporation
fonds, Vol. 1, File: R-1-1-9, Radio Speech on the CBC by C. D. Howe, 23 October
1944, 1-7.
6  
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Throughout the war, the Departments of Munitions and Supply
(dms) and National Defence (dnd) resorted to constructing additional
buildings or leasing property to meet their expanding spatial needs.
The Royal Canadian Navy, for instance, owned and operated about 1.3
million sq. ft. of storage space throughout the war and leased another
926,000 sq. ft. to meet its operational needs. However, demobilization
triggered significant budget cuts and downsizing. According to the
estimates of A/Captain G. L. Roome, the Director of the Navy’s
Disposal Organization, the postwar navy did not have the money
to rent property from civilian sources while several base closures
dropped the Navy’s total available storage capacity to 1.145 million
sq. ft.9 Since this was not enough to maintain a sizeable postwar fleet,
there was an added incentive on clearing out unneeded kit; surplus
assets could not take up stowage space ahead of operational stores.10
Yet the unwanted objects would not simply dematerialize on their
own initiative. In order to aid the military in downsizing materiel
requirements and coordinate a disposal program to support the
postwar transition, the federal government established two disposal
agencies, the Crown Assets Allocation Committee (caac) and the
War Assets Corporation (wac). These two organizations became
important pillars of demobilization.
Both the caac and wac derived authority from order-in-council
PC9108, issued on 23 November 1943, and later the Surplus Crown
Assets Act, passed by Parliament in July 1944. The caac was
an inter-departmental committee and administrative hub for all
surplus declarations. It formulated general policies, facilitated interdepartmental transfers, and consigned all surpluses to the wac for
final disposal. The wac handled all physical aspects of disposal by
collecting, storing, maintaining, selling, or destroying all surpluses
in accordance with caac recommendations.11 By the summer of
1945, both organizations were fully integrated as staff in the wac ’s
procurement branches held dual appointments in the caac ’s head

9  
LAC, RG24 Department of National Defence fonds, Vol. 11686, File: CSS 1-2-2,
“Decommissioning of H. M. C. Ships,” A/Captain G. L. Roome, 9 April 1945, 1-2.
10  
Twelve months after VE-Day the Navy had downsized almost all its rented storage
facilities. LAC, RG24, Vol. 8178, File: NSS 1813-1, “Memorandum to the Deputy
Minister,” Captain G. B. Hope, 22 June 1946.
11  
Alex Souchen, “Peace Dividend: The War Assets Corporation and the Disposal
of Canada’s Munitions and Supplies, 1943-1948,” (PhD Dissertation, Western
University, 2016), 56-78 and 81-132.
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office, while the Chairman of the caac , John Berry, became President
of the wac in July. Before taking on the disposal job, Berry served as
the Director-General of Automotive Production and Motor Vehicles
Controller. He remained with the wac until July 1949.12
At its peak, from the fall of 1945 to the spring of 1947, the
wac managed over 6 million sq. ft. of indoor storage space at fiftyone warehouses spread across the country. In conjunction with
the military, it also maintained several aircraft, vehicle, and ship
graveyards where larger weapon systems were cannibalized and stored
until sold or scrapped.13 However, ammunition and explosives posed
a separate challenge that an empire of temporary facilities could not
always accommodate in peacetime. To safely store bombs and bullets
they need to be placed in secure, weather-resistant, lightning-safe,
and purpose-built magazines. When the war ended, these specialized
facilities quickly turned into crowded chokepoints as each branch of
the Canadian military consolidated its inventories. Although disposal
policies were already in place by that time, the amount of ordnance
and the speed at which it piled up caught everyone off guard.
The storage crisis became most acute at Bedford. In early March
1945, naval officers in Halifax and Ottawa attempted to accommodate
the growing bottleneck by acquiring several buildings in Dartmouth
known as Hazelhurst Barracks. In April the Navy drew up plans
to lease the buildings from the Army, but they were thwarted by
the local Wartime Housing Administrator who objected to the plan
on 10 May. In the wake of the ve -Day riots, which exposed the
depth of tensions between the military and civilian populations in
Halifax, some immediate countermeasures had to be taken to ease
the city’s housing shortage. As a result, the Housing Administrator

LAC, RG32 Public Service Commission fonds, Vol. 598, File: Berry, John Hatton,
“Employees History Record – Questionnaire,” 1-2 and “Civil Service of Canada –
Application Form,” 1-4; Carolyn Cox, Canadian Strength, (Toronto: Ryerson Press,
1946), 85-87; House of Commons, Special Committee on War Expenditures and
Economies, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (hereafter SCWEE), 20 November
1945, (Vol. 2, No. 1), 4-5.
13  
Some boneyards maintained war diaries: LAC, RG24, Vol. 22791, War Diary
(WD) – No. 1-11 Surplus Equipment Holding Units, 1944-1946. See also: Paul
Ozoak, Abandoned Military Installations of Canada, (no publisher, 1991).
12  
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Photo 2: Building 69 looking back towards the Bedford Depot from the south jetty. This was
the epicentre of the explosion. [“Events Leading Up to the 1945 Explosion,” Plate 22]

could not repurpose habitable buildings for ammunition storage.14
The Navy had to look elsewhere and eventually found other facilities
at St. Polycarpe, Quebec (once the British vacated their magazines),
Argentia, Newfoundland (where the Americans had built large
bunkers), and in Renous, Nova Scotia.15 Yet this extra space did
little to resolve the overcrowding that only continued to escalate
once overseas shipments ceased and combat vessels returned to port.
From 1 May to 18 July 1945, Bedford’s north and south jetties were
frantically busy de-ammunitioning a total of eighty-three ships.
Most of these vessels were frigates and corvettes, but at least twelve
LAC, RG24, Vol. 34395, File: N.S.S. 5135-1 Vol. 1, W. G. Mills Deputy Minister
(Navy) to A. Ross Deputy Minister (Army), 9 March 1945 and 16 May 1945; Ross
to Mills, 20 March 1945; Memorandum “Hazelhurst Barracks, Dartmouth N.S.” H.
S. Rayner (Director of Plans) to W. G. Mills, 5 April 1945 and 16 April 1945;
and Memorandum “Hazelhurst Barracks, Dartmouth N.S.” Secretary of the Naval
Board to Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Northwest Atlantic, 10 May 1945. See also:
Keshen, Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers, 71-93, 130.
15  
LAC, RG24, Vol. 34395, File: N.S.S. 5135-1 Vol. 1, “Storage of Ammunition,”
Deputy Minister (DMS) to W. G. Mills Deputy Minister (Navy), 23 May 1945; and
W. G. Mills to Chief of Naval Staff, 26 September 1945.
14  
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destroyers emptied their entire arsenals into the depot’s custody
before the explosion. Without many alternatives, naval officers relied
on “floating magazines” (anchored lighters and barges) to store the
contents of at least twenty-six ships and scrambled to purchase
tarpaulins for everything else piling up outdoors.16 By mid-July at
least fifty-five large tarpaulins (30 ft. by 30 ft.) were distributed
to armament depots at Kamloops, Esquimalt, St. John, Shelburne,
Sydney, Quebec City, and Bedford.17
Photographic evidence also shows the scale of congestion at
Bedford. Photo 2 demonstrates that, at the south jetty’s receiving
and triage centres, ordnance was piled up densely near the water and
in contravention of the military’s safety regulations. Additionally, two
aerial photographs (Photos 3 and 4) reveal a different perspective on
the crowded facility. These large before and after images were taken
in March and August 1945 and compiled by a committee of experts
convened to investigate the explosion. Within that lunar landscape of
the after image, two major craters are visible (one was 170 ft. wide by
90 ft. deep and the other was 130 ft. wide by 75 ft. deep), neither of
which align with the surrounding storage bunkers in the before image.
Thus, in the weeks before the explosion, personnel at Bedford stacked
ordnance wherever there was space available thereby leaving large
quantities of explosives in makeshift shelters that were not designed
to contain the energetic force and debris of a detonation. The depot
turned into a powder keg that was only one careless mistake away
from igniting a disaster.
The investigative committee published two reports under the
chairmanship of Lt-Col. G. Ogilvie, the dms’s Director of Ammunition
Filling and Chairman of the wac ’s Plant Decontamination Committee.
The first report was ready in late August and it examined the explosion’s
causes and consequences, the military and civilian responses, and
the cleanup operations. The second was published in October and it

Director General of Naval Ordnance, “Events Leading Up to the 1945 Explosion
at RCN Magazines Bedford, N.S. and Clearance of Devastated Areas,” (19491952), 9. Courtesy of John McCallum. (Hereafter “Events Leading Up to the 1945
Explosion”).
17  
LAC, RG24, Vol. 34395, File: N.S.S. 5135-1 Vol. 1, R. M. Keirstead (Naval
Stores Office, Halifax) to Director of Naval Ordnance, 5 July 1945; “Tarpaulin for
Ammunition,” G. W. F. Pringle (Naval Armament Supply Officer, St. John) to
Director of Naval Ordnance, 23 June and 16 July 1945; and “Tarpaulins 30’ x 30’”
W. B. Finnigan (Naval Stores Officer) to Director of Naval Stores, 17 July 1945.
16  
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Photo 3 Aerial photograph showing the Bedford Depot in March 1945. Note the number and
locations of the buildings and south jetty. [LAC, RG24, Vol. 8070, File: 1270-41]

Photo 4 Aerial photograph of the Bedford Magazine in August 1945. Note the destruction
and the locations of the two major craters. [LAC, RG24, Vol. 8070, File: 1270-41]
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made recommendations for redesigning and rebuilding the facility.18
In attempting to determine what caused the explosion, Ogilvie’s
committee conducted some extensive research and interviewed several
witnesses and first responders. Despite their efforts, the committee
could not definitively prove what started the initial fire. The report
speculated on several potential causes: the spontaneous combustion
of flammable materials, a stack of ammunition suddenly shifting and
striking a primer cap, or sparks from a coal-fired boiler on a nearby
floating pile driver (though the report dismissed this cause since it
was “banked at 4 p.m .”).19 The report concluded that the most likely
cause “was considered to be fire, the probable origin of which was due
to unauthorized smoking and carelessness with respect to disposal
of ignited smoking materials.”20 The report added that this situation
was compounded by the congestion, a laxity in enforcing safety
regulations, and the personnel turnover caused by demobilization.
The fact that this congestion was allowed to develop begs an
important question: why was the Navy not dumping ordnance into
the Atlantic before July in order to resolve a dangerous situation?
This question has some merit since the practice of “drowning” (a
colloquial term used at the time) gained Privy Council approval on 4
August 1944 when PC6099 was issued on the recommendation of the
dms . PC6099 outlined the disposal process for surplus ammunition,
bombs, and weaponry by identifying a hierarchy of organizations
that could legally acquire them. The dms had first priority for “war
purposes” followed by other departments in the federal, provincial,
and municipal governments. If no sale could be arranged “within
a reasonable time” than the wac was allowed to dispose of “such
items…by the most suitable method of elimination, such as dumping
into the sea or reducing to basic materials should such reduction be
considered economical and the hazard involved therein be considered
not excessive.”21 In practice, though, PC6099 retroactively approved
disposal policies that the caac and wac had established earlier in
the year. Almost from the day the two organizations were formed,
the armed forces declared a variety of “war-like material which is a
LAC, RG24, Vol. 8070, File: 1270-41, G. Ogilvie to Douglas Abbott, 22 August
1945, 1-8; and G. Ogilvie to W. G. Mills, 1 October 1945.
19  
Ibid, “Royal Canadian Navy Press Release” no date, 3-4.
20  
Ibid, 3-4.
21  
PC6099, 4 August 1944.
18  
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danger to life” and military assets with “no known peace-time uses.”22
From January to May 1944, these declarations included, among other
things, approximately 12,000 cartridges of ammunition, 797 cases
of dynamite, and 20,000 blasting caps left over in Newfoundland
from building the Gander-Lewisporte-Bishop’s Falls highway.23 As
a result, the caac approved a special exemption that authorized the
dnd to destroy all unneeded small arms, ammunition, and explosives
without formally declaring them surplus through regular channels.24
Therefore, from May 1944 onwards the armed forces gained a free
hand to dispose of surplus munitions without intrusive civilian
oversight.
There were two general reasons why dumping was not taking
place in order to cope with the storage crisis in mid-1945. The first
reason had to do with the political interests at stake and the second
was the mechanics of disposal operations. Over the summer of 1945,
the military’s postwar budget had yet to be established. At the time,
not only was the dnd still technically at war in the Pacific, but
its leaders were also fighting a war in Ottawa over its future size
and shape. Since each branch of the Canadian military pressed the
Liberal government for the largest possible budget, there was little
utility in relinquishing large portions of their inventories, particularly
before the Dominion election in June. Not only was this counterproductive to continuing combat operations, it was also detrimental
to legitimizing their sizable postwar demands, which in the case of
the Army included peacetime conscription.25 The military was able
to drag its feet because the European war had ended so early in the
1945-1946 fiscal year. For the most part, federal departments had
the funding to maintain their inventories, while at the same time
petition for a greater share of the next federal budget. This accounts
for why March and April 1946—the end and beginning of the fiscal
year—were the peak months of surplus declarations (for all types of

SCWEE, 21 May 1946, (Vol. 3, No. 13), 340.
LAC, RG101, Vol. 4, File: 1-1-13, Crown Assets Allocation Committee – Meeting
Minutes (CAAC – Meeting Minutes), Schedule B 23 February 1944, Schedule D and
E 21 April 1944,
24  
The Services provided lists of what ammunition was destroyed. SCWEE, 20
November 1945, (Vol. 2, No. 1), 13, 20, and 24.
25  
J. L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace, (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2002), 315.
22  
23  
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assets, not just munitions). Federal departments waited until the last
moment to abnegate public property.26
The mechanics of disposal operations also contributed to the
overcrowding. Since the wac ’s primary mission was to recoup as
much money as possible from the sale of surpluses, it required time
to find potential clients. Surplus items would only get reduced to
constituent materials or completely destroyed if all potential sales
were ruled out.27 This resulted in a delay between the declaration
of an item and its final disposal. Reports filed through the Army’s
Master General of Ordnance (mgo) Branch in April 1945 exposed
this problem and its implications for the timing of demobilization. In
effect, the wac ’s selling priorities would hinder the military’s ability
to demobilize quickly after the war, particularly since it had yet to
expand its warehousing capacity to relieve the military of custodial
responsibilities.28 Since surpluses remained in depots while the wac
tried to find clients, the space where the military could consolidate
the assets it wanted to keep was adversely affected.
The lag between declaration and final disposal developed across
all categories of goods, but it was felt most acutely at ammunition
depots where storage space was at a premium. Although the wac ’s
warehousing capacities grew rapidly over the fall of 1945, it did
not procure many storage facilities for ammunition and explosives
because the dnd’s exemption was supposed to save it from funding the
construction and operation of new magazines. However, an unforeseen
complication arose when the dnd chose to file surplus declarations
for several types of weapons and ordnance in useable conditions or
with potential civilian applications in highway construction, policing,
and the mining industry.29 Left with little alternative but to piggyback on the military’s facilities, the wac rented space for ammunition
storage and funded various disposal programs, which included
“Number of Declarations of Surplus Received by Months, 1944-48,” in War Assets
Corporation Fourth Annual Report (April 1, 1947 to March 31, 1948), 7.
27  
War Assets Corporation First Annual Report, (July 12, 1944 to March 31, 1945),
3, 27-28; War Assets Corporation Second Annual Report, (April 1, 1945 to March
31, 1946), 3-8.
28  
LAC, RG24, Reel: C-8432, File: 9106-5 Vol. 1, “Position of Surplus Stores
Declared by M.G.O. Branch,” J. V. Young to Deputy Minister, 18 April 1945, 1-2.
See attached appendices: “Typical Example of Stores Declared Surplus [Director
of Ordnance Services (General Stores)] and Not Yet Disposed of War Assets
Corporation,” Appendix III, 1-2.
29  
Souchen, “Peace Dividend,” 208-19.
26  

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2017

13

Canadian Military History, Vol. 26 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 3
14

Under Fathoms of Salt Water

Fiscal Year

Storage and
Maintenance
Costs

Cost of
Ammunition
Disposal

Cost of Mustard
Gas Disposal

1945-1946

-

$2,893.45

$114,429.59

1946-1947

$775,285.83

$392,322.66

$80,580.53

1947-1948

$21,887.92

$627,890.20

-

Total

$797,173.75

$1,023,106.31

$195,010.12

Table 1: WAC Payments for Ordnance Storage and Disposal. Storage costs for 1945-1946
are not available. No money was spent on mustard gas disposal in 1947-1948. [War Assets
Corporation Second Annual Report, (April 1, 1945 to March 31, 1946), 21-22; War Assets Corporation
Third Annual Report, (April 1, 1946 to March 31, 1947) 26; War Assets Corporation Fourth Annual
Report, 20.]

both the scrapping and dumping of ordnance. Table 1 charts the
wac ’s financial investments on ordnance storage and disposal. Over
the 1946-1947 fiscal year, the Army received $775,285 for storage
services, but in the following year it was paid just $21,887. This
drop in storage costs, coupled with the dramatic rise in ammunition
disposal expenses and the Navy’s own expenditures on dumping
(which totalled $2,879,362 by April 1946), provides an indication
about the peak and timing of dumping operations in the 1940s.30
Additionally, since the wac ’s leadership expected the dnd to
make regular use of its ammunition exemption, they also assumed
that space would become available in ordnance depots for weaponry
declared surplus by foreign governments. Because of international
agreements with the United States and the United Kingdom, all
foreign-owned surpluses in Canada were declared to the caac and
wac .31 Therefore, leftover American and British ordnance added to the
congestion in Canadian depots. In fact, according to British records,

SCWEE, 11 April 1946, (Vol. 2, No. 5), 124
For Anglo-Canadian agreements see: Government of Canada, Treaty Series 1946,
No. 10, Agreement Between Canada and the United Kingdom on the Settlement
of War Claims, 6 March 1946; Robert Bryce, Canada and the Cost of World War
II: The International Operations of Canada’s Department of Finance, 1939-1947,
Matthew J. Bellamy, ed. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
2005), 296-309. For Canadian-American agreements see: Government of Canada,
Treaty Series 1946, No. 12, Exchange of Notes between Canada and the United States
of America Constituting an Agreement on the Subject of War Surpluses and Related
Matters, 31 March 1946; Stanley Dziuban, Military Relations between the United
States and Canada, 1939-1945 (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History,
1959), 320-31.
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a portion of what exploded at Bedford was later identified as British
in origin.32 Of course, in the immediate aftermath, the ownership
and quantities that were destroyed remained unknown until a proper
inventory was commissioned. As Captain R. W. Wood, the Director
of Naval Ordnance, explained in a letter to an official in the dms’s
Ammunition Filling Division, the lists of surplus ammunition were
now outdated and had to be cancelled “due to the explosion in Halifax
where most of the surplus ammunition was held.” He continued, “in
view of the above it is requested that the disposal of the ammunition
as previously submitted be held in abeyance until a firm stock report
is received from our Halifax depot at which time a new list will be
forwarded.”33
A few days later these orders were countermanded by Ogilvie.
On 28 August, he recommended Wood forgo all inventory tabulations
and “proceed from the standpoint of clearance rather than of future
use” in order to commence “dumping at once.”34 Instead of inspecting
everything found in the devastated zone, the ordnance was written
off, not only because it was replaceable from other sources, but
what had not already detonated was likely damaged. In fact some
munitions, namely the 850 Mark XI depth charges, were especially
volatile and required special attention to release the gasses that had
built up inside them.35 Thus, the urgency of the storage crisis and its
implications for public safety crystalized in the minds of some military
authorities who now realized that any policy delaying disposal might
contribute to another accident and thereby jeopardize public safety in
Halifax or elsewhere.
Expediting destruction programs became a paramount
consideration after the Bedford Explosion. Not only was public safety
at risk from accidental explosions, but there was also a possibility
that criminals might acquire surplus munitions. For politicians and
bureaucrats, the Bedford Explosion put an exclamation point on a
growing wave of concern for public safety. Over the summer and

The National Archives (TNA), ADM 1/17547, “Clearance of Surplus Ammunition
Held in America and Canada,” briefing note, paragraphs 5 and 6, December 1945.
33  
LAC, RG24, Vol. 34394, File: 5130-1, “Re: Disposal of Ammunition Surplus
to Royal Canadian Navy Requirements,” Captain R.W. Wood (Director of Naval
Ordnance) to Mr. K. M. MacKenzie, 13 August 1945.
34  
LAC, RG24, Vol. 8070, File: 1270-41 Vol. 1, “Memorandum to the Minister,” 28
August 1945.
35  
Ibid, G. Ogilvie to Douglas Abbott, 22 August 1945, 4.
32  
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fall of 1945, many people worried about the “flood of weapons going
about the country.”36 Almost overnight, gun violence, unregistered
firearms, and unemployment became hot-button political and
social issues. With government contracts terminating, the economy
stuttered out of its wartime boom, just as nearly 2 million veterans
and war workers looked to restart their civilian careers in a stagnant
economy later gripped by unprecedented strikes and labour disputes.37
Worst-case scenarios seemed to pop up everywhere. In one poignant
accident, an Ottawa boy was shot and killed by a friend showing off
a souvenir revolver. In another incident in late-October 1945, three
thieves broke into the Canadian War Museum and stole weapons
from several display cases, one of which was used in the shooting
death of an Ottawa police officer.38
These events (and others like them) prompted some significant
changes to Canada’s disposal policies. On 23 November 1945,
Berry wrote to C. D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply and
Reconstruction, about making modifications to PC6099 and the
wac ’s selling policies. In light of “recent events,” Berry was concerned
about the length of time that surplus munitions were stored while the
wac found potential customers.39 This meant that a major delay was
built into the disposal process and obstructed the start of destruction
programs. Berry wanted Howe to decide whether lethal stores should
be kept for a “prescribed period” to await potential sales or destroyed
immediately “if no known sale” was possible when they first became
available.40 It was clear that Berry favoured the second option and
his minister concurred. “The matter is so important,” Howe wrote in
his short cryptic reply of 5 December, that the Cabinet Committee
on Reconstruction had to approve the new measures.41 At a meeting
a week later, Howe explained that “in view of the lack of market,

As quoted in: R. Blake Brown, Arming and Disarming: A History of Gun Control
in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 156.
37  
Joy Parr, Domestic Goods: the Material, the Moral, and the Economic in the
Postwar Years (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 21-39, 61-70; Peter
S. McInnis, Harnessing Labour Confrontation: Shaping the Postwar Settlement in
Canada, 1943-1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 87-112.
38  
Brown, Arming and Disarming, 156; Andrew Burtch, “Dead Man’s Gun: True
Crime in Postwar Ottawa 1945-1946,” Ontario History Vol. CII, No. 1 (Spring 2010):
1-19.
39  
LAC, RG101, Vol. 2, File: 9-2-1, J. H. Berry to C. D. Howe, 23 November 1945.
40  
Ibid.
41  
Ibid, C. D. Howe to Berry, 5 December 1945.
36  
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inadvisability in certain instances of general sale, and substantial
costs of storage, it appeared desirable to destroy the goods in question
rather than retain them in storage.”42 At his urgings, the Committee
directed the wac “to proceed with mutilation and sale as scrap of
the arms and ammunition involved” if no known sale existed.43 This
slight adjustment on paper signalled a major change in disposal
procedures as surplus munitions were now slated for immediate
destruction instead of being held for possible sales. With postwar
budgets confirmed by December, the timing was significant as the
Canadian armed forces were on the verge of divesting even larger
portions of their kit.

canada’s ammunition dumping program
When hostilities ended, the standard procedures for all lethal
stores were well-established on paper and tested with the limited
amount of tactical equipment declared surplus before May 1945. The
military would cannibalize weapon systems as needed to maintain
operational requirements and declare the remainder surplus. Until
the changes to PC6099, any dangerous items were stored by the
armed forces pending the wac ’s ability to sell to a select clientele
of foreign governments, police forces, or dealers who acquired the
requisite permits and passed the rcmp ’s background checks. If the
“single purpose implements of war” could not be sold and no civilian
applications were discovered then the items were referred to the wac ’s
Scrap Disposal Branch and Ammunition and Chemical Disposal
Board for final disposition.44 These organizations determined the
best course of action and made recommendations for destruction.
In regards to ammunition disposal, the dnd kept these two agencies
up to date about the types and quantities slated for drowning and,

Ibid, Memorandum, V. W. Scully to J. H. Berry, 15 December 1945.
Ibid; LAC, RG2, Vol. 121, File W-45, V. W. Scully to J. R. Baldwin, 7 December
1945 and attached exemplar.
44  
SCWEE, 20 November 1945, (Vol. 2, No. 1), 13; LAC, RG101, Vol. 7, WAC –
Board of Directors, Meeting Minutes, 11 May 1944; LAC, RG101, Vol. 4, File 1-1-13,
CAAC – Meeting Minutes, 19 May 1944; PC6099.
42  
43  
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if necessary, the wac directed the military to use an alternative
destruction method.45
Munitions could only be destroyed through several imperfect
methods. The available options included: abandonment, scrapping,
incineration, and dumping. Of all the options, abandonment was the
least preferable because it usually involved burial and maintained
a continuing security liability since criminals might recover the
ordnance, while changes in land use could yield a future danger for
unsuspecting civilians. Abandonment was only considered viable if
the items were in an unusable condition or if the costs of transport,
storage, and reduction were too prohibitive. Large-scale controlled
explosions were used, but the quantities that required destruction,
their distribution across Canada and Europe, and the concussive force
of the blast greatly limited the locations where this was logistically
feasible.46 However, small-scale detonations and open-air fires were
employed more frequently, though the facilities and furnaces that
industrialized this process only emerged later in the twentieth
century.47
Scrapping or the “reduction of surplus to produce” was the
preferred destruction method. It was defined by the process of breaking
apart a system of objects that formed a larger “apparatus” in order to
salvage the components and materials for reuse or resale.48 Although
scrapping was most profitable with larger weapon systems (such as
aircraft or ships), reducing ammunition, explosives, and chemical
weapons was a risky business. To scrap ordnance, suitable amounts of
time and care were needed, particularly given the dangerous nature of
the task. A continuous supply of expert staff was essential for safety
and efficiency, while storage facilities and security arrangements were

SCWEE, 9 April 1946, (Vol. 2, No. 4), 93-94; War Assets Corporation Second
Annual Report, 7.
46  
On 18 April 1947 the Royal Navy detonated 6,800 tons of explosives on Heligoland
Island. The objective was to destroy the German fortifications, but the island was
split in two. The “British Bang” is one of the largest non-nuclear explosions in
history.
47  
Donovan Webster, Aftermath: The Remnants of War (New York: Pantheon Books,
1996), 11-80, 253-73.
48  
War Assets Corporation Second Annual Report, 7.
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needed for pre-processed items.49 Overcoming these challenges meant
forestalling the discharge of weapons specialists and the maintenance
of demilitarization facilities where shells were boiled (to remove the
explosive compounds) and melted down (to recover the metals). Yet
within the context of a postwar rush to rapidly retool factories for
civilian production and reduce military commitments, the availability
of scrapping facilities was not commensurate with the amount of
leftover ordnance. Although conventional weapons were reduced with
some success by the crown corporation, Canadian Arsenals Ltd.,
industrial demobilization and the quantities involved conspired to
negate widespread feasibility.50
The fact that there were several options for destroying surplus
ordnance demonstrates that dumping was not a forgone conclusion.
However, it was arguably the best alternative. In order to destroy
ordnance, a location of deposit and a suitable destruction method are
both required. As far as contemporaries were concerned, the efficiency
of disposal was determined by how well those two requirements
were combined. In other words, disposal was most efficient if the
location where ordnance was placed was the destruction method.
The oceans fit the bill. Disposal at sea obviated the need for costly
storage facilities on land and the water formed a security barrier
that reduced the risk of recovery.51 Dumping also offered a means
for quickly liquidating bulk quantities. This was important given
the destruction of European and Asian transportation networks, the
heavy demands on Allied shipping, limited storage space at home, and
the worldwide distribution of munitions. Additionally, objects could
be thrown overboard as a whole or in parts which limited handling
and avoided the need for extensive mutilation. This greatly expedited
disposal and ensured it kept pace with demobilization timetables and
the reconstruction of the civilian economy.

Ogilvie stressed the importance of having good officers overseeing the cleanup.
There was some concern that the three in charge would “leave the Service in the
near future.” LAC, RG24, Vol. 8070, File: 1270-41, G. Ogilvie to Douglas Abbott,
22 August 1945, 7.
50  
War Assets Corporation Second Annual Report, 7.
51  
Recent technological advancements have increased the risk of recovery. Oliver
Holmes, “Images reveal three more Japanese WWII shipwrecks torn apart for scrap,”
The Guardian, 9 February 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/09/
images-reveal-three-more-japanese-wwii-shipwrecks-torn-apart-for-scrap (accessed 9
February 2017).
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The fact that oceans were conceived of as a place and means
for disposal should surprise no one. For much of recorded history,
garbage, sewage, and industrial wastes were dumped into the closest
lakes, rivers, and oceans without regard for public health or water
pollution. As Joel Tarr explained, every process “be it natural,
consumer, or production” needs “a sink” for waste and that the
“ultimate sink” was the cheapest and most convenient disposal
method available.52 Unfortunately, this meant pumping and dumping
waste into the closest waterways. Government officials and scientists
in the mid-twentieth century did little to overturn the practice. At
the time, a common scientific notion centred on “threshold values” or
the idea that there was a safe amount of contamination that could be
introduced into the water.53 Although within the scientific community
there were wide opinions on how thresholds were first established
and monitored, the vast quantity of water in the oceans was viewed
as a tool that could render any pollutants harmless. This enabled a
permissive attitude towards dumping and relieved officials of major
concerns for the cumulative amount jettisoned at sea. Instead, their
focus migrated towards managing the size, locations, and frequency
of each dumping operation. In other words, since the water could
dilute and diffuse contamination, the key issue devolved to ensuring
that the water’s absorption threshold was never overwhelmed by any
single dumping operation.54 Thus, as long as each voyage drowned
an acceptable quantity of ordnance at a sufficient depth and distance
from the shoreline, dumping could continue indefinitely since no
adverse effects on human health were immediately apparent and
environmental indicators (such as dead or discoloured fish) could be
dismissed as temporary. The time lapse between each dump and
the mixing of polluted and non-polluted waters was supposed to
eliminate the problem.
When Canadians started dumping ammunition they were far
from trailblazers. In fact, Canada was following precedents set
after both world wars. Following the Great War, the Allies used
Joel A. Tarr, The Search for the Ultimate Sink: Urban Pollution in Historical
Perspective (Akron, Ohio: The University of Akron Press, 1996), 385.
53  
Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Poison in the Well: Radioactive Waste in the Oceans at
the Dawn of the Nuclear Age, (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2009), 1038, especially 29-38.
54  
Tarr, The Search for the Ultimate Sink, 398-403; Hamblin, Poison in the Well,
10-38, 41-72.
52  
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dumping to dispose of surplus and captured ordnance that could not
be disassembled. Throughout the 1920s, conventional and chemical
weapons were dumped along the French and British coasts, in the
English Channel, and the North and Baltic Seas.55 A generation
later when the Allies occupied the shattered remnants of Germany
and Japan in 1945, they immediately initiated demilitarization
and disarmament programs to consolidate their power. Right
as humanitarian aid trickled into devastated areas, an exodus of
weapons, ammunition, scientific equipment, production machinery,
and expertise occurred.56 Yet this precipitated a major pragmatic
dilemma: the Allies confiscated a massive array of weaponry, but
only a small fraction had any residual scientific or military value,
while the remainder posed a major security liability for occupational
forces.57 Allied demobilization compounded this liability by shrinking
the size of military forces and materiel requirements. For instance,
the British Army—just one branch of the country’s armed forces—
estimated that it possessed 1.2 million tons of surplus ammunition in
the uk alone.58 In effect, the amount of munitions requiring disposal
was larger than just captured enemy weaponry. It included all types
of Allied munitions spread across thousands of locations, from small
islands in the Pacific to storage magazines on the home front and
everywhere in between.
It was in this wider context that Canada’s dumping program
took shape. As an important but middle-ranked power, Canada

TNA, MUN 4/6046, “Minutes of Proceedings of the Commission Appointed to
Examine the Request of Messrs. Pickett & Son to Dump in the Sea from the Port of
Dunkerque Gas Shells and other Ammunition,” 1 June 1921, 1-6. See also: Thomas
Stock and Karlheinz Lohs, eds., The Challenge of Old Chemical Munitions and
Toxic Armament Wastes. Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies No. 16, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
56  
For example, see: Annie Jacobsen, Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence
Program that Brought Nazi Scientists to America (New York: Little, Brown, &
Company, 2014).
57  
By November 1945, the American Sixth Army was dumping 4,500 tons every day
in Japanese coastal waters. Supreme Allied Commander for the Pacific, Reports of
General MacArthur: MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase, Vol. 1
Supplement, Reprint (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1994), 136.
See also: H. Lindsey Arison III, European Disposal Operations: The Sea Disposal of
Chemical Weapons (No Publisher, 2013).
58  
Beaufort’s Dyke Background (London: Ministry of Defence, no date), paragraph 3;
Beaufort’s Dyke Dumping Ground (London: Ministry of Defence, no date), paragraph
4.
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had no formal occupation zone in Germany, although the Army
participated in British occupation duties in the Netherlands and
Emden-Wilhelmshaven area in northwest Germany. Over the
summer of 1945, and despite protests from the Dutch government,
Canadian soldiers collected and incinerated large amounts of German
weaponry and other confiscated items.59 They also dumped enemy
munitions into the North Sea. In late July, Major Frank Swanson,
a correspondent for the Hamilton Spectator, reported that “the last
and biggest ammunition dumping program of the Canadian army is
underway…It will see six million tons of enemy ammunition consigned
to the depths of the North Sea under fathoms of salt water.”60 In
reality though, Canada’s contributions to German disarmament were
a drop in the bucket compared to what the Americans, British, and
Russians dumped into the Baltic Sea. Scientists now estimate that
a combination of saltwater corrosion and water currents have spread
rusting bombs over perhaps one-third of the Baltic’s seabed and
underwater explosions are now large enough that seismic instruments
frequently detect them.61
The main element of Canada’s dumping program was located on
the country’s Pacific and Atlantic coasts, where thousands of tons
of weapons and ammunition were sunk. Over the summer of 1945,
Canadian military authorities designed the future scope of operations
and the first task was identifying suitable dump sites. When selecting
potential locations, they sought input from provincial governments
and companies operating undersea cables. In late June, a list of sites
was circulated to cable companies and the provincial departments of
fisheries bordering the St. Lawrence. Most replies were favourable.
The Halifax and Bermuda Cable Company did not foresee any
For complaints about the destruction of weapons and civilian goods, see: LAC,
RG25 Department of External Affairs fonds, Vol. 3732, File: 5979-G-40, Letter to The
Secretary of State for External Affairs, 19 July 1945, 1-2; Pierre Dupuy (Ambassador
to the Netherlands) to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 2 August 1945, 1; and
“re: Disposal of Enemy Material in Holland,” A. Ross to N. A. Robertson, 5 August
1945, 1-2.
60  
Frank Swanson, “Dump into Sea Hun Ammunition,” Hamilton Spectator, 21 July
1945.
61  
Axel Bojanowski, “World War II Munitions Dumps: A Rusting Time Bomb in
the Baltic,” Spiegel Online, 4 April 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/
europe/world-war-ii-munitions-dumps-a-rusting-timebomb-in-the-baltic-a-475520.
html (accessed 22 March 2015); G. Ford, L. Ottemoller, and B. Baptie, Analysis of
Explosions in the BGS Seismic Database in the Area of Beaufort’s Dyke, 1992-2004
(British Geological Survey: Seismology & Geomagnetism Programme, 2005), 1-15.
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problems and viewed the proposed locations “as being normally safe
as far as our cables are concerned” and its officials had “no reason
to anticipate any break in communication from such activity.”62
However, a few changes were suggested by Western Union because
the proposed dump sites were too close to their cables.63 Although
one might expect an input from the provincial governments, both the
fisheries departments in Quebec and Nova Scotia quickly agreed to
the plans.64
In one form or another, ammunition dumping received approval
from provincial and federal officials, fisheries departments, military
authorities, scientists, corporations, and journalists. It appears
that few policymakers considered contacting fishermen or coastal
communities bordering dump sites. This may have been a conscious
attempt to silence sources of opposition and negative publicity,
though it is doubtful that any dissenting opinions would have raised
doubts about the necessity of dumping. Concerns over the long-term
environmental impact of corroded shells were simply washed away. In
fact, the only environmental concern appearing in this correspondence
was the short-term risk of accidental explosions and the danger this
posed to the supply of salmon in the area. As one undated message
from the Naval Officer In-Charge (noic) of Quebec explained to his
counterpart in Cape Breton: “Provincial Deputy Minister of Fisheries
concurs in proposed area for dumping ammunition provided there
will be no explosions during dumping as for next 6 weeks to 2 months
salmon run from Gaspe Peninsula to North Shore will be on.”65
On 14 September 1945 a confidential memorandum to the
Secretary of the Naval Board approved three areas for dumping on
the country’s Atlantic coast:
1)

Off Halifax,

ns

Within a radius of (5) nautical miles from a position bearing 116° and
distant forty (40) nautical miles from Chebucto Head Lighthouse.
(Approximate location Latitude 44° 12’ N, Longitude 62° 42’ W)

LAC, RG24, Vol. 11121, File: 70-2-6 Vol. 1, Manager Halifax Branch to ViceAdmiral G. C. Jones, 21 June 1945.
63  
Ibid, W. Adamson (Western Union) to Vice-Admiral G. C. Jones, 20 June 1945.
64  
Ibid, Arthur Labrie to Commander F. B. Latchmore, 4 July 1945.
65  
Ibid, “Naval Message,” NOIC Quebec to NOIC Sydney, June 1945.
62  
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2)

Off Sydney,

ns

Within a radius of five (5) nautical miles from Latitude 46° 19’ N,
Longitude 58° 39’ W.
3)

St. Lawrence

Within an area bounded as follows: Southern Limit, Latitude 49° 30’N.
Western and Northern Limit, the 100 fathom contour line bordering the
North Shore of the St. Lawrence. Eastern Limit: Longitude 65° 30’W.66

Following these orders dumping operations steadily increased,
particularly at the Emerald Basin, the first location identified above
and the place where the bulk of damaged shells were thrown during
the Bedford cleanup. According to an internal report, from 18 July
to 1 October 1945 approximately 2,200 tons of ammunition from
Bedford was dumped in the vicinity of the Emerald Basin.67
Following the establishment of designated dump sites, naval
authorities ordered all depots to forward lists of stores dumped over
the summer. These lists are some of the only surviving evidence
detailing what was discarded at sea. In combination with the related
correspondence, they also provide coordinates where some dumping
took place. Inventories were submitted to naval headquarters from
Levis, Quebec, St. John, New Brunswick, and Sydney, Nova Scotia
(as well as other naval bases though these lists have not survived).
The noic at St. John reported the smallest totals; only 181 projectiles
in unserviceable condition were dumped at sea.68 The noic at
Levis explained that only one ship, hmcs St. Pierre, was dumping
munitions, but it had jettisoned roughly 40,000 different projectiles
into the St. Lawrence at locations near the third designated site.
These included 12,406 cartridges of 20mm Oerlikon high explosive
(he) rounds, 4,944 cartridges of 40mm Bofors he (with fuzes), 300

LAC, RG24, Vol. 34394, File: 5130-1, “Confidential – Memorandum to Secretary
– Naval Board,” Captain R.W. Wood, 14 September 1945.
67  
“Events Leading Up to the 1945 Explosion,” 24.
68  
The items included depth charges, hedgehogs, rockets, and 4” shells. LAC, RG24,
Vol. 11121, File: 70-2-6 Vol. 1, “Naval Message” NOIC St. John to Naval Service
Headquarters, no date.
66  
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depth charges, and several dozen primers and fuzes.69 Unfortunately,
because of Ogilvie’s orders the depots at Dartmouth and Bedford
did not maintain any lists, as the NOICs stated that “no record of
explosive stores jettisoned by ships” was available. However, they
did suggest that each ship’s armament ledger could be consulted
instead.70
By far the largest inventory of dumped stores came from the noic
at Sydney. This is not surprising given that the Bedford Explosion
forced the Navy to adjust the locations where it demobilized its vessels.
At the time of the Bedford Explosion, de-storing operations were
well-underway at Sydney, Shelburne, and St. John’s, Newfoundland.
Between 7 June and 6 July 1945, forty-eight ships offloaded ammunition
in Sydney. These numbers only continued to increase after Bedford’s
storage facilities were destroyed.71 De-ammunitioning a naval vessel
involved the removal of all ordnance from the ship’s magazines to
a facility on land. In practice this meant that personnel removed
all the ordnance that the Navy wanted to keep and instructed the
skeleton crew to dump the stores while on route to the wac ’s main
ship graveyard at Sorel, Quebec. It was at Sorel where vessels were
decommissioned and stored until the wac sold them off.72
The Bedford Explosion greatly influenced the geography of
Canada’s dumping program and ensured that large stores were
jettisoned around Cape Breton, south of Newfoundland, and all the
way up the St. Lawrence to Montreal. The Sydney inventory detailed
all items dumped from May until September 1945. According to
the list, 522,972 objects were tossed into the ocean. This included
252,658 cartridges of .303-inch small arms ammunition, 101,729
cartridges of 20mm Oerlikon rounds, 19,992 cartridges of 2-pounder
quick firing artillery shells, 2,305 depth charges, and thousands of
other projectiles divided into fifty-three different categories of types

Ibid, Memorandum, Lt. E. Rogers Scriver (NOIC Levis, Quebec) to Commanding
Officer Atlantic Coast, 15 September 1945.
70  
Ibid, “Naval Message,” Supt. Naval Armament Depot (Dartmouth) to Naval
Service Headquarters, no date.
71  
LAC, RG24, Vol. 11686, File: CSS 1-2-2, “Memorandum: General Activities
Sydney Sub-Command,” A/Captain J. McCulloch (NOIC Sydney) to H. M. C.
Dockyard, 6 July 1945, 1-2.
72  
Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), 81/5200/8000-8000, Box 242, File:
10, “Statement on War Assets Corporation Operations in the Disposal of Marine
Craft,” by John Berry, 7 May 1946, 1-11.
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and calibers.73 The early intensity of dumping operations is quite
striking considering that most of these items were dumped when
postwar requirements were still in flux and war with Japan loomed
ahead. However, once hostilities ended in the Pacific and postwar
budgets were confirmed, the totals continued to increase.
By the end of September 1945 drowning munitions was a
standard practice of the peacetime military. Naval headquarters
started tracking operations through weekly summaries, rather than
requesting reports after the fact. Unfortunately, as the archival record
is incomplete, it is unclear for how long these summaries were used.74
However, the summaries for the weeks ending 29 September and 6
October suggest a general pattern. According to these documents
dumping was a daily occurrence unless adverse weather kept ships
in port. For the week ending on 29 September “an estimated 550
tons of ammunition” was dumped. The following week, inclement
weather limited operations to just 350 tons.75 Tables 2 and 3 list
the types and quantities dumped off the Atlantic coast over this
two-week period. Additionally, another summary that divided total
tonnage by ship gives some indication about how much was sunk per
day. Along Canada’s eastern coast, every vessel assigned “dumping
duties” carried about 30-35 tons daily.76 However, there were days
that departed from this average: hmcs Poundmaker dumped 44 tons
on 10 October, while hmcs Buckingham and Victoriaville dumped
55 tons and 19 tons respectively on 13 October.77 The Navy made
good use of Old Davy Jones’ Locker.

LAC, RG24, Vol. 11121, File: 70-2-6, “Explosive Stores Jettisoned,” A/Captain J.
McCulloch to Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, 19 September 1945, 1-3.
74  
The lack of documentation is common in all countries. William Brankoqitz,
Chemical Weapons Movement: History Compilation (Aberdeen Proving Ground,
MD: Official of the Program Manager for Chemical Munitions, 27 April 1987), 1;
Beaufort’s Dyke Background, paragraph 7 and 14; Peter G. Brewer and Noriko
Nakayama, “What Lies Beneath: A Plea for Complete Information,” Environmental
Science & Technology (March, 2008), 1394-99.
75  
LAC, RG24, Vol. 11121, File: 70-2-6 Vol. 1, “Disposal of Ammunition, Report for
Week Ending 29 September 1945,” Supt. Naval Armament Depot (Dartmouth) to
Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, 3 October 1945.
76  
About ten ships were tasked with dumping. For a partial list, see: LAC, RG24,
Vol. 11684, Naval Message, n. d.
77  
LAC, RG24, Vol. 11121, File: 70-2-6 Vol. 1, “Disposal of Ammunition, Report
for Week Ending 13 October 1945,” Supt. Naval Armament Depot, (Dartmouth) to
Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, 27 October 1945.
73  
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Type of Ammunition Dumped
Depth Charges, Mk. VII
Cartridges, q . f. 4” Mk. XIX
Cartridges, 20

Quantity
1,050
517

Oerlikon

49,000

Cartridges, b . l . 4” Full and Reduced Charges

1,456

mm

Cartridges, q . f. 3” 20 Cwt.

27

896

Cartridges, q . f. 2 Pdr. h . e ./ h .v.

71,512

Cartridges, s . a . 9 mm

58,880

Cartridges, .303”

4,000

Shell q . f. 4.7”

93

Shell, q . f. 4”

714

Shell, q . f. 12 pdr. 12 Cwt.

91

Projectiles, 1¾ Hedgehog

1,929

Fuzes, Time No. 198

525

Primers, d/c Mk. VII

170

Table 2: Disposal of Ammunition, Report for Week Ending 29 September 1945. [LAC, RG24,
Vol. 11121, File: 70-2-6 Vol. 1, “Disposal of Ammunition, Report for week ending 29 September 1945,”
Supt. Naval Armament Depot (Dartmouth) to Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, 3 October 1945.]

The Army and Air Force also operated separate dumping
programs. This fact complicates the history of Canada’s postwar
disposal program, as four organizations (the Army, Air Force, Navy,
and wac) were engaged in dumping, but few documents exist outside
of naval records. However, there is some evidence indicating that the
Army drowned ammunition in the Great Lakes. On 20 November 1945,
James Vipond, a reporter for the Globe and Mail, informed readers
about the Army’s test dump of 150 tons of obsolete ammunition. The
ordnance was jettisoned into seventy-eight fathoms of fresh water
at Dyer Bay on Lake Huron, two miles from the Bruce Peninsula
and several miles north of Owen Sound. The test, performed by
the Great Lakes tugboat Northern, took several trips to complete
and the twelve soldiers accompanying Captain J. M. Seldon threw
the explosives overboard by hand. Seldon explained in an interview
that it was not possible to salvage any materials from the shells and
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Type of Ammunition Dumped
Depth Charges, Mk. VII
o.q . f. 2 pdr. h . e ./ h .v.

Quantity
100
89,956

Mine Charge Cases

23

Cartridges, u. s ., 3” 50 Cal.

236

Cartridges, s . a ., 5” Vickers

196,140

Cartridges, s . a ., .30 Cal.

256,139

Shell, q . f. 4” Mixed

249

Warheads 21” Mk. IV-VB

8

Warheads 21” Mk. II

4

Fuzes, Time No. 198

100

Table 3: Disposal of Ammunition, Report for Week Ending 6 October 1945. [LAC, RG24, Vol.

11121, File: 70-2-6 Vol. 1, “Disposal of Ammunition, Report for week ending 6 October 1945,” Supt.
Naval Armament Depot (Dartmouth) to Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, 12 October 1945]

that the ammunition was obsolete since Dunkirk.78 Apparently this
successful test dump paved the way for future operations in Dyer Bay
as the Army expected to ship at least 1,000 tons of ammunition from
Petawawa to Owen Sound. Adding to the operation’s success was the
fact that the wac sold the wooden boxes and metal containers used
for storing the ordnance as 10,000 wooden tool boxes and 5,000 boxes
for packing fish.79
Despite the parallel dumping programs, each branch of the
Canadian military cooperated when necessary and dumping became
a joint operation. In several documented instances (particularly those
involving mustard gas), the inter-service cooperation was essential.
When dumping gas, the Army was responsible for the shipping and
handling of drums on land, while the Navy provided the vessels,
navigation, and “other marine aspects.” The wac covered the financial
expenses.80 By the mid-1950s, the separate programs were merged and
the Navy performed all dumping operations which grew to include
78  
James Vipond, “Ancient Ammo Racked in Old Davey’s Locker,” Globe and Mail,
20 November 1945.
79  
Ibid.
80  
“Dump 600 Tons of Mustard Gas into Pacific Later This Month,” Globe and Mail,
16 September 1947; War Assets Corporation Third Annual Report, 26; War Assets
Corporation Fourth Annual Report, 20.
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radioactive waste. Throughout most of the Cold War both sides of
the Iron Curtain dumped and discharged radioactive waste into the
world’s oceans, rivers, and lakes at alarming rates.81 In Canada, the
military’s standard disposal procedures directed service personnel to
put the radioactive materials in leftover paint cans and encase them
in concrete before dumping them into a minimum of 1,000 fathoms of
saltwater.82 One dumping operation in 1960 jettisoned 24,930 lbs. of
“radioactive tubes” along with 2,783 lbs. of fuzes and 43,039 lbs. of
“miscellaneous ammunition” at an undisclosed location off the Pacific
coast.83 A year later, the Navy dumped a minimum of 15,512 lbs.
of “radioactive materials” (along with 130,885 lbs. of conventional
munitions) into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.84
For the most part, dumping took place in the general vicinities
of the sites identified by Captain Wood’s September memo. But it
is foolish to assume that all ordnance wound up on the seafloor in
perfect piles at the right locations. At the time, dumping was far from
an exact science and its implementation was replete with many serious
challenges and obstacles. On any given day, dumping operations were
handicapped by imprecise navigational technologies, bad weather,
and rough seas which put vessels off course and sometimes far away
from designated locations. Moreover, it was not uncommon for crews
to jettison ordnance before their ship even reached the authorized
dumping areas. An early start was preferred by ship captains leery
of navigating at night and private contractors worried about paying
costly overtime charges because of navigational and weather delays.
Even if ships reached the designated locations, it took hours for
crews to offload everything while the ship stayed in constant motion.
Therefore, the radius of 5 nautical miles identified by Wood was easily

For more information, see: Jacob Darwin Hamblin, Poison in the Well: Radioactive
Waste in the Oceans at the Dawn of the Nuclear Age (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 2009).
82  
LAC, RG24, Vol. 34395, File: 5130-1 Vol. 6, “Drowning of Explosives (RCAF),
West Coast,” Naval Secretary to Commodore Superintendent Pacific Coast, 21
March 1960.
83  
Ibid, “Drowning of Explosives (RCAF), West Coast,” Naval Secretary to
Commodore Superintendent Pacific Coast, 11 April 1960.
84  
LAC, RG24, Vol. 34395, File: 5130-1 Vol. 7, “Ammunition and Radio Active
Materials, Disposal by Drowning,” K. W. Walton to Chief of Naval Staff, 13 June
1961, 1-2.
81  
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Photo 5: On arrival at the ammunition dumping ground off Cairnryan, members of the Royal
Army Ordnance Corps place shells on gravity rollers that take the ammunition over the side
of the ship and into the sea. [Image © IWM (H 42208)]

traversed and the cargo was dispersed over a wider and unrecorded
area.85
The physical act of dumping introduced further difficulties.
Photographic evidence provides some indications about how dumping
took place. Unfortunately, there are no known pictures of Canadian
dumping operations in action, but the military did not invent any
new techniques and therefore American and British photos are likely
representative of Canadian practices. In the 1940s, dumping was a
labour-intensive and time-consuming process. Loose munitions were
always dumped one at a time by hand in order to limit bumping,
sparks, mid-air collisions, and accidental explosions. Photo 5 shows
British soldiers from the Royal Army Ordnance Corps stationed out
of Cairnryan using “special gravity rollers” when dumping ordnance

LAC, RG24, Vol. 11121, File: 70-2-6 Vol. 1, “Disposal of Ammunition, Report
for week ending 6 October 1945,” Supt. Naval Armament Depot (Dartmouth) to
Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast, 3 October 1945.

85  
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in Beaufort’s Dyke, the uk’s largest disposal site.86 Sometimes
personnel, like the soldier in the background, would simply resort to
heaving shells as far as they could from the ship’s deck.
The utility of gravity rollers doubled when dumping heavier
items, such as crated ordnance or larger caliber shells. However, this
activity was dangerous for the inattentive worker whose clothing or
extremities were liable to get caught in a crate’s riggings. At least
one fatality occurred in this manner onboard hmcs Eastore. On 9
October 1947, a civilian contractor named B. J. Pothier drowned when
his hand got trapped in a crate’s handle before it rolled overboard.
The heavy crate sunk like an anchor and Pothier’s body was never
recovered.87 Besides gravity rollers, there was one other dumping
technique commonly used. This other method involved loading a
surplus Landing Ship Tank (lst) in port with ordnance and then
scuttling it at a designated location. This practice mitigated the risks
to weapon specialists and was used extensively for bulk quantities of
chemical weapons or dangerously degraded ammunition.88
The challenges of dumping are illustrated by one operation
that took place in February 1946 near Sable Island. The debacle,
recounted in dnd records and by John Bryden in Deadly Allies,
developed into a series of errors as nothing went according to plan
and changes were improvised on the fly.89 On 18 February, lst No.
209 was loaded with about 2,000 tons of mustard gas and towed out
to sea by two tugboats hired from a private firm in Halifax called
Foundation Maritime. The two tugs and lst 209 were accompanied
by a naval escort, the minesweeper hmcs Middlesex, and an old army
supply ship, hmcs General Drury, carrying members of the local
press, the Army’s disposal officer, and the wac supervisor. While on
route, the convoy hit a winter gale that threw them off course and
prevented a scuttling party (provided by a Montreal-based private
contractor Hayes, Stuart, and Coy Ltd.) from boarding the ship. The
original plan was to use depth charges to sink the lst, but when it
was discovered that 100 drums of mustard gas were stowed on the
Beaufort’s Dyke Dumping Ground, paragraph 17.
Wright, The Other Halifax Explosion, Chapter 9, 5.
88  
Report on Sea Dumping of Chemical Weapons by the United Kingdom in the
Skaggerrak Waters Post World War Two (London: Ministry of Defence, no date),
1-4.
89  
John Bryden, Deadly Allies: Canada’s Secret War, 1937-1947 (Toronto:
McClelland & Stewart, 1989), 11-13.
86  
87  
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main deck and not in the cargo hold, the plan was nixed. At dusk
when the weather cleared, the scuttling party boarded the lst but
botched the job when they “neglected to open the after sea cocks.” As
a result, the “hulk settled very slowly and was only half submerged
at daylight the following day.”90 At this point, the Middlesex was
ordered to “holed the after end [of the lst] with Oerlikon fire.” After
expending 400 rounds, the lst finally sank in water 1,000 fathoms
deep and “200 miles from Halifax and 60 miles South and South East
of Sable Island.”91 Several of the drums were observed floating around
the dump site afterwards and rifle fire from 50–70 yards was used
to sink them. Indeed, dumping could be dangerous, improvised, and
occur far away from any sanctioned locations.
The imperfect techniques, combined with navigational limitations
and the strength of ocean currents, multiplied the number of
locations where munitions settled on the seafloor. Consequently,
it is difficult to estimate the total number of dump sites in
Canadian waters. According to Terrence Long, the Chairman of the
International Dialogue on Underwater Munitions (idum), there are
some 3,000 dump sites along Canada’s Atlantic coast alone, while
the dnd recognizes only a fraction of his assessment (See Map).92
Unfortunately, the real number will likely remain a mystery given the
fragmentary nature of relevant archival collections, the lack of public
transparency and engagement, and the limited amount of available
research funding. However, such divergent estimates about the scale
and scope of Canada’s dumping program are indicative of the need
for closer collaboration between governments, researchers, and other
stakeholders. Definitions about what exactly constitutes a dump site
need to be firmly established so that funds can be directed towards
site surveys, ordnance identification, and risk assessments for both
human health and offshore economic developments.

LAC, RG24, Vol. 8060, File: 1240-15 Vol. 1, “Report of Proceedings, Scuttling
Hulk LST 209 Loaded with Mustard Gas,” Lt. Cdr. B. P. Young to Commanding
Officer HMCS Scotian, 21 February 1946, 1-2.
91  
Ibid, and “Disposal of Mustard Gas,” Brigadier H. J. B. Keating to C. N. S. 7
February 1946; Bryden, Deadly Allies, 11-13.
92  
For a list of “legacy” UXO sites, see http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/businessunexploded-ordnance/uxo-sites.page (accessed 10 September 2016).
90  
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Map of possible dump sites around Nova Scotia. The coloured blocks are areas identified for
oil and gas exploration and development (2003). [Image courtesy of Terrance P. Long, Chair of the
International Dialogue on Underwater Munitions (idum)]

the environmental legacy of disarmament
Wherever Allied armies fought, the tyranny of distance was
conquered before the enemy was defeated. The vast bodies of water
separating the war front from the industrial front posed the greatest
geographic and logistical obstacles to victory. However, in peace,
they became the ideal places for discarding the detritus of war. In
retrospect, the dumping of munitions might appear today like some
immoral transgression and that the Allies carelessly perpetrated an
environmental disaster in disarming themselves and their enemies.
No doubt there is some truth to that assertion, but the objective
here was not to debate the morality of dumping within the context
of today’s growing environmental concerns. Instead, the objective
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was to understand why and how ocean dumping became a widelyused disposal method for conventional and chemical munitions.
The decision to dump munitions was conditioned by many factors
and variables, which included: historical and international precedents,
quantities and types, speed and efficiency, capacity and distribution,
financial costs, public safety, the security of occupation forces, and,
perhaps most pressing of all, freeing storage space at ammunition
depots. As one dnd official wrote to Captain M. A. Medland, Wood’s
successor as Director of Naval Ordnance, in May 1946, “it is intended to
dump all surplus imperial stocks of ammunition and explosives stores
held at [Royal Canadian Naval Armament Depots] so that further
stowage space which is urgently required may be made available at
an early date.”93 At the time, policy making and implementation
were constrained by the physical, financial, pragmatic, and spatial
realities of a demobilizing military and government bureaucracy. The
over-riding priority was to divest assets quickly. There were simply
few concerns about the corrosive powers of saltwater or the longterm ecological consequences of releasing large amounts of chemicals,
acids, heavy metals, and carcinogens into marine environments and,
possibly, the food chain. In the end, this short-sighted disarmament
strategy has left a potentially devastating legacy. As time goes on
and corrosion continues, these tools of death and destruction will
slowly return to endanger another generation.
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